When reports emerged that Baemin might be sold again, I went back to founder Kim Bong-jin's interviews. He had talked about growing a Korean company internationally while balancing the benefits for the people around it. I wanted to understand how those ambitions had fared under Delivery Hero, and what a second sale would mean for them.

Baemin is the Korean food-delivery app that replaced paper restaurant flyers with a mobile service. Its parent, Woowa Brothers, agreed in 2019 to join Germany's Delivery Hero, with plans to expand across Asia. Delivery Hero has now reportedly appointed J.P. Morgan and begun discussions with potential buyers at an asking valuation of roughly ₩7–8 trillion. Naver, Meituan, Grab and Uber are among the names in circulation. As of this note, these remain reports of a sale process.

For me, another sale raises a question the valuation cannot settle. Korea built a valuable company, and that company kept growing after its acquisition. Who has benefited from that growth, and how much of it can support Baemin's future? That is the question I bring to the public accounts.

The first acquisition

Reading the December 2019 announcement, I can see the appeal of the original partnership. Kim would help lead the combined Asian operations, and Woowa would gain resources and experience for expansion. The companies also committed to innovation benefiting restaurants, consumers, employees and riders.

The agreement valued Woowa at $4 billion on a cash-free, debt-free basis, with consideration in both cash and Delivery Hero shares. The acquisition was subject to approvals and completed in March 2021.

I read the expansion promise alongside a change in who decided where Baemin's money went. Delivery Hero could support investments that Woowa would have struggled to make alone, but it also had operations elsewhere to fund. The founder's wish to balance stakeholder benefits would depend on how the new owner chose between those uses of cash.

What Baemin earned and paid out

To assess that balance, I want to see what Baemin generated and what went to its parent. Revenue growth is encouraging, but Woowa's 2024 results make me cautious about treating it as the measure of success: the business grew while rising operating costs, including outsourced-service expenses, reduced operating profit.

Financial result Reported value
2024 consolidated revenue Approximately ₩4.32 trillion
Revenue growth from 2023 26.6%
2023 operating profit ₩699.8 billion
2024 operating profit ₩640.8 billion

Reporting of Woowa's disclosure.

The cash paid to the parent bears more directly on my ownership question. Woowa made substantial distributions through two different transactions:

Year Form of payment Amount
2023 Dividend ₩412.7 billion
2024 Purchase and cancellation of shares held by the parent ₩537.2 billion
Combined About ₩950 billion

CEOScore's account of Woowa's financial records.

Those payments alone don't show that Baemin lost a particular opportunity to invest. That would require knowing which projects were available and what cash they needed. Dividing the distributions by operating profit would not settle it either, because operating profit is not the cash available for distribution.

What the records do let me examine is the owner's choice to take cash out of a successful Korean business. Kim's idea of balanced benefits interests me precisely because the people who make the service work do not necessarily control that choice. Establishing whether they were disadvantaged would take more evidence than these accounts provide.

Why Delivery Hero might sell

Given Baemin's profitability, why would Delivery Hero sell? The contemporaneous reporting connects the discussions to pressures on the wider group. Seen that way, Baemin's success could make it attractive to sell, since it may raise money that other parts of the portfolio cannot.

I would not go as far as saying Delivery Hero cannot meet its debts without a sale. That judgment would require a fuller view of its refinancing options and other sources of cash. Nor would I calculate its investment return by comparing the possible sale price with only the cash paid in the original acquisition. Shares were part of the price too, and distributions and financing have changed the economics since then.

My concern for Baemin is what a new owner's purchase would ask of the operating business. An acquisition financed with heavy borrowing could create pressure for further distributions. A buyer combining Baemin with an existing service might have a reason to invest in it. Until the financing and operating plan are available, the asking price tells me little about which outcome is more likely.

Korean capital after a startup exit

The part of Kim's vision I keep returning to is the possibility of Korean startup success financing more Korean startups. A founder or early investor can sell shares and use the proceeds to back another company. That is a meaningful benefit of an exit, including an exit to a foreign buyer.

A resale by Delivery Hero is a different transaction. It would pay the current seller. It would not automatically put money into Baemin or a new Korean business; those outcomes would depend on what the buyer and seller did next.

That leaves me with two questions about Korea's capital markets. Can domestic investors take part in the later ownership of companies such as Baemin? And are proceeds from earlier startup exits helping finance the next generation? Baemin is a reason to investigate both, although one company's history cannot tell me how much capital circulates through the entire ecosystem.

Questions for the next owner

I would welcome a serious Korean bid, because it would give domestic capital a larger role in Baemin's future. I would still read its financing terms closely. A Korean owner can face pressure to repay acquisition debt, just as a foreign owner can have a reason to invest in the service. The buyer's nationality cannot answer my original question about who benefits.

For any proposal, I would want to know:

  • How much acquisition debt Baemin would be expected to support.
  • Which investments would remain funded after payments to the owner.
  • How the buyer plans to compete with Coupang Eats while keeping the service viable for restaurants and riders.

I would carry the same distinctions into a policy discussion. Protecting Baemin's ability to invest is a matter of its acquisition financing and subsequent distributions. Encouraging founders to fund new companies is a matter of what happens to their exit proceeds. I care about both, but they call for different evidence and different responses.

Going back to Kim's interviews, I find his ambition a more useful guide than the resale price for judging what comes next. The proposal I want to read is one that explains how Baemin will keep growing, what its owner expects to receive, and how the people who depend on it will benefit.

This essay concerns reporting and financial results available by February 9, 2026. The proposed sale had not been established as a completed transaction.